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Abstract 
The objective of this analysis is to derive several econometric estimates of the Panzar-
Rosse statistic of industry structure in order to determine whether the dried plums market 
resembles that of a firm collusion (monopoly or tightly structured oligopoly), a hybrid of 
monopolistic and competitive tendencies (monopolistically competitive), or perfectly 
competitive.  The result of the Panzar-Rosse test is the H-Statistic: the sum of all elasticities of a 
firm’s total revenue with respect to factor prices focusing on the long run equilibrium. 
This study looks at data from a previous study conducted by Alston et al (1998) that includes 
firm level data for three of the participating firms in the dried plums industry from September 6, 
1992 through July 7, 1996 and data provided from Sunsweet Cooperative encompassing firm 
level data from six firm participants from July 20, 2008 through June 13, 2010.  Ordinary least 
squares regression equations were estimated to determine the elasticities of firm level input costs 
and other exogenous variables.  A total of four regression equations per data set were tested in 
order to compile the necessary information for the formulation of the Panzar-Rosse H-Statistic.  
Adjusting for econometric concerns, overall the results show an H-Statistic commensurate with 
that of an industry that is operating as monopolistically competitive.   In examining the evolution 
of firm-level changes from the time period of the first data set to that of the second, the results 
suggest the industry, while remaining monopolistically competitive, has also become more 
competitive; a finding consistent with the decreased concentration noted in the industry over 
time.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Several tendencies in small, niche agricultural markets, such as the dried plums (prunes) 
market, suggest that the industry is behaving as a monopolistically competitive one.  In this 
study, we examine the recent evolution of the industry structure of the dried plums market by 
looking at firm level data from several time periods.  Through this examination, we focus 
specifically on retail input and output costs and price tendencies throughout the market.  In doing 
so, we derive several econometric estimates of the Panzar-Rosse statistic of industry structure in 
order to determine whether the dried plums market resembles that of firm collusion (monopoly 
or tightly structured oligopoly), a hybrid of monopolistic and competitive tendencies 
(monopolistically competitive), or perfectly competitive.  The following introduction is a 
background of the trends in the dried plum industry, the history of dried plum processing, and a 
review of economic definitions pertaining to industry structure. 
 United States Dried Plum Production 
Dried plum trees were first introduced to North America circa 1856 from France and 
were first transplanted in California and crossed with wild dried plum varieties that were already 
grown there.  Previously, apples and pears were the largest commodity being grown in 
California, but with a drastic decline in the apple and pear market, more and more dried plum 
varieties were being planted all across California as a profit stabilizing measure.  Dried plum 
demand increased steadily with this market shift and thus California became prime dried plum 
growing territory, producing over 70 percent of the world’s entire dried plum crop. 
Sunsweet Cooperative, the world’s largest dried plum processor, began in the world’s 
largest dried plum producing locality, Yuba County, California.  Throughout the changing 
market atmosphere into the 1900’s, Sunsweet worked steadily to advance sales of dried plums 
through advertising and marketing efforts.  Currently there are several processors in California 
participating in similar efforts as discussed later in this introduction. 
In the years leading up to 1980, there was an increase in the demand for added fiber in 
human diets, which included the consumption of dried plums.  This large increase in demand led 
to a strong increase in producer returns that generally totaled over $1,000 per ton.  With this 
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increase in price came the predicable increase in the total acreage being planted for the 
production of dried plums.  California dried plum producers increased their growing capacity 
from 70,000 acres to nearly 90,000 acres leading to production of over 200,000 tons of dried 
plum per year (Sunsweet Annual Report, 2009).  Per-capita dried plum consumption has 
declined in recent years; however, as demonstrated in Figure 1.1 (USDA 2009), though the 
reasons are not entirely due to a decline in consumption. 
 
Figure 1-1: Prune Consumption Trends Per Capita 1980-2009 
 
 The dried plum industry has dealt with a lot of fluctuation in dried plum consumption and 
thus, too the dollars paid to the producer in the past several years.  Figure 1.2 shows the utilized 
production of dried plums from 1995 through 2009, and Figure 1.3 shows the dollars paid to 
producers from 1995 through 2009.  These fluctuations have many causes, with the largest cause 
being a decline in export availability from the United States because of crop disasters in 
California.  This then opened the market share for other dried plum exporters such of France, 
Chile, and Argentina.  According to the USDA’s Foreign Agriculture Service, Chile exports 
nearly 90 percent of its total dried plum production.  Similar exports are seen out of Argentina as 
well.  Currently, the United States and France export approximately 40 percent of their total 
dried plum production.  The largest importer of dried plums from the United States is Japan 
(USDA FAS, 2005). 
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Figure 1-2:Utilized Dried Plum Production, 1995-2009 
 
Figure 1-3:Dollars Paid to Producers, 1995-2009 
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 Domestically, the decrease over the past 20 years in demand for dried plums is due in 
large part to marketing misconceptions.  In 2001, the Food and Drug Administration approved 
the request to “re-identify prunes as dried plums after a request by the industry and the California 
Prune Board…in an attempt to overcome the negative perception of prunes being a laxative for 
the elderly” (Boriss et al 2011).  More recently, processors such as Sunsweet, have been putting 
dried plums through the value-added process and producing such products as Sunsweet Ones
®
, 
individually wrapped dried plums that serve as a healthy and convenient snack.   Processors have 
also increased the breadth of advertising to include such expenditures as having recipes that 
include dried plums as the focus in many home magazines.  
 Dried Plum Industry Chain and Processors 
The dried plum marketing chain consists of growers, processors, and retailers.  
Processing begins when the fresh plum is mechanically harvested and then dehydrated shortly 
after harvest.  The two most prevalent varieties are the “French Prune” and the “La Petite 
d’Agen”.  These varieties are popular because they have increased sweetness, which allows them 
to be dried without having to go through the fermentation process.  “In 2008, one ton of dried 
prunes was equivalent to 2.9 tons of fresh prune variety plums” (Boriss et al 2011). 
 Over half of the dried plum producers in California belong to the Sunsweet Cooperative, 
the “industry’s largest and only producer-owned processing/marketing cooperative for dried 
plums” (Boriss et al 2011).  There are 20 other processors in operation in California, with seven 
processors handling the majority of the dried plum crop (California Dried Plum Board 2011).  
The competing processors examined in this study are Sunsweet, Private Label, Champion, Del 
Monte, Mariani, Sun Maid, and Dole. 
 Industry Structure Basics 
To examine the results of the models using the Panzar-Rosse test for industry structure, it 
is important to note a few key characteristics of monopolistic, monopolistically competitive, and 
perfectly competitive firms.  The following descriptions adhere to general economic principles 
through definitions and graphical representations. 
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 Monopoly 
The widely accepted definition of a monopoly is a “single supplier to a market…[which] 
may choose to produce at any point on the market demand curve” (Nicholson 2008, p.491).  The 
reason monopolies exist are typically due to significant barriers to entry that give a monopoly 
sole access to the market.  Firms that act collusively also fit the characteristic of monopoly, this 
collusion is de jure illegal in the United States with the exception of particular collusive grants 
by the federal government.  In order to maximize profits, all firms produce at an output level in 
which the marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost, but in the case of monopoly, marginal 
revenue does not usually equal price.  Key characteristics of a monopolistic market are that the 
demand curve of a monopoly, being equivalent to the entire demand for the industry, is 
downward sloping.  As marginal revenue decreases, quantity sold increases (Sanders 2009).  
Figure 1.4 shows the profit maximization of a monopoly, where P is price; Q, quantity; MC, 
marginal cost; AC, average cost; MR, marginal revenue; and D, demand (Sanders 2009). 
Monopolies lead to the misallocation of resources because the price paid by the consumer 
exceeds the firm’s marginal cost of production resulting in a deadweight loss to society and 
economic profits for the monopoly.  Monopolies may also be able to increase profits in some 
circumstances by employing price discrimination if they are able to sell otherwise identical 
goods of output at varying prices (Nicholson 2008, p. 407). 
 
Figure 1-4:Profit Maximization of a Monopoly 
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 Monopolistic Competition 
Monopolistic competition is defined as an industry structure that has many competitors, 
with a very slightly modified output among the firms.  Monopolistic competition was first 
defined in the 1930s by Edward Chamberlin and Joan Robinson.  Because of the importance to 
this thesis, a fuller discussion of monopolistic competition is presented in the literature review of 
Chapter 2.  Common examples of firms believed to be operating under monopolistic competition 
include banks and restaurants.  Key characteristics of monopolistic competition include the idea 
that under this industry structure, relative to the monopoly or oligopoly cases, there are lower 
barriers to entry, if any; knowledge of product processes is widely known, but is not perfect 
between firms; each firm makes its own selling decisions based on its own particular costs of 
production; oftentimes products are differentiated, but ever so slightly; firms are price makers 
facing a downward sloping, firm-level demand curve; while exhibiting monopolistic tendencies, 
advertising is a must, but can oftentimes be done as a whole industry; and they are assumed to be 
profit maximizers (Monopolistic Competition  2011). 
Figure 1.5 demonstrates a typical marginal revenue and average cost curve for 
monopolistic competition.  “In equilibrium, the firm is producing where average revenue (AR) is 
tangent to average costs (AC), also where marginal revenue (MR) is equal to marginal cost (MC) 
resulting in price being greater than marginal cost but equal to average cost for zero economic 
profit” (Silva 2010, p.22). 
 
Figure 1-5:Monopolistic Competition 
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 Perfect Competition 
The typical discussion of perfect competition includes a description of an industry with 
many buyers and sellers; no barriers to entry; buyers and sellers having perfect information; and 
firms producing homogeneous goods.  Perfectly competitive firms, like all firms, produce where 
marginal revenue equals marginal cost.  However, in the case of perfect competition because the 
price is determined at the intersection of market supply (the horizontal sum of all firms’ marginal 
cost curves) and market demand (the horizontal sum of all consumers’ demand curves), the 
perfectly competitive firm has a marginal revenue equal to price.  In other words, the firm is a 
price taker as opposed to the price makers of the previous two examples.  Figure 1.6 shows the 
equilibrium of supply and demand under perfect competition and shows that perfectly 
competitive firms are both allocatively and productively efficient where price (P), equals 
marginal cost (MC), and average total cost (ATC), equals marginal cost (MC). 
  
Figure 1-6:Equilibrium and Efficiency of Perfect Competition 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
 Panzar-Rosse Test for Industry Structure 
The model used in this thesis is an application of the Panzar-Rosse test for “monopoly 
equilibrium” (Panzar and Rosse 1987).   This test was developed by John Panzar and James 
Rosse and results in a comparative statics analysis based on testable predications from the 
“firm’s reduced form revenue equation” (Panzar and Rosse 1987, p. 443).  The end result of this 
test is the Panzar-Rosse H-Statistic: the sum of all of the elasticities of a firm’s total revenue with 
respect to factor input prices focusing on the long-run equilibrium.  Although similar in function 
to the various statistical estimations of conjectural variations and other market power parameters, 
the Panzar-Rosse test is particularly useful because it includes monopolistic competition as one 
of the interpretations of the industry-structure parameter.  This is important in industries for 
which a great deal of product differentiation is seen along with relatively low barriers to entry.  
The details of the construction of the H-Statistic are fairly complicated, but the parameter itself is 
straightforward after estimating a fixed-effects econometric model of firm-level revenue over 
time estimated as a reduced-form equation.  As will be shown below, the dependent variable is 
the log of firm revenue and the independent variables consist of representative input costs and 
other exogenous variables.  The H-Statistic itself is simply the sum of the coefficients on the 
logged values of the input values over all firms in the study.  As explained by Goddard  and 
Wilson  (2006, p. 560) who applied the test to the U.S. banking industry, “H is negative if firms’ 
pricing policies are consistent with the textbook model of monopoly.  H is positive but less than 
unity under monopolistic competition, and H is unity under perfect competition.”  In simple 
terms, H<0 if an industry is monopolistic (e.g. firms are behaving collusively), 0<H<1 if an 
industry is monopolistically competitive, and H=1 if the industry is perfectly competitive. 
 Studies Conducted Using the Panzar-Rosse Test 
The majority of the studies conducted using the Panzar-Rosse test focus on the 
international trade and banking sectors.  Hamza (2011, p.263) presented a summary of studies 
adopting the Panzar-Rosse test in the banking sector. The summarized research examined 
banking data collected from the United States, Canada, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, 
France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Greece, New Zealand, Tunisia, Brazil, Hong Kong, and Korea 
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and ranged in time from 1979 through 2006.  A vast majority of the studies found that the retail 
banking industry is monopolistically competitive in the particular country being examined using 
the H-statistic. 
In 1982, Shaffer authored the first reported application of the Panzar-Rosse test on the 
banking industry using an early draft of the work officially published by Panzar and Rosse in 
1987 (Goddard and Wilson 2006).  Based on his sample data of banks in New York, Shaffer 
found that the industry was monopolistically competitive.  In 2006, Goddard and Wilson 
presented their findings after extrapolating data from 5,929 banks from 25 developed and 
developing countries.   
Goddard and Wilson (2006) employed the Panzar-Rosse test through the fixed effects 
estimation of the following regression, using firm level-data: 
 
In the above regression ri,t equals total revenue of bank i in year t; wj,i,t equals the price of 
the factor input j; xi,t is a vector of exogenous control variables; ηi,t is a random disturbance term; 
and is the H-Statistic (Goddard and Wilson 2006).  While Goddard and Wilson found that the 
fixed effects estimator and the H-Statistic were significantly biased to zero, the “proportions of 
the countries for which [they] were unable to reject a null hypothesis of H=1 in favor of an 
alternative of H<1 turn out to be identical for the models based on [fixed effects] and [general 
method of moments] estimation” (Goddard and Wilson 2006, p.543).  Therefore, their findings 
were consistent with previous literature studies; they concluded that the banking sector was 
monopolistically competitive. 
Other industry structures that have been evaluated using the Panzar-Rosse test include the 
airlines and motor carrier industries in the United States.  Fischer and Kamerschen (2003) used 
the Panzar-Rosse test to examine the market structure of selected airport-pairs originating from 
the Atlanta airport.  The airline industry has seen a shift from strict regulation to less stringent 
regulation which now allows airlines to employ their own pricing strategies, have more control 
over their flight schedules, and allows firms to make their own market entry and exit decisions.  
Proponents of this shift cite the opportunities for increased performance standards due to the 
increase in competiveness between firms. 
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Fischer and Kamerschen created models for each separate airline carrier using a general 
method of moments approach.  They employed “price and quantity data for outbound traffic, 
year dummies and their interaction term as instruments for inbound traffic, and inbound data as 
instruments for outbound data” (Fischer and Kamerschen 2003, p. 82).  They found that the 
majority of the airport-pairs tested were monopolistically competitive according to the Panzar-
Rosse test and continued their analysis by performing cross-sectional regressions.  Their final 
conclusion was that while these airport-pairs proved to be monopolistically competitive, the 
increase in competiveness in the airline industry is in the best interest of the traveling public 
(Fischer and Kamerschen 2003). 
Transportation economist Savage (2011) used the Panzar-Rosse test to evaluate the 
United States motor carrier industry.  According to the Federal Highway Commission, the 
interstate trucking industry consists of approximately 260,000 firms with 5 percent of these firms 
producing 70 percent of the industry miles.  With this statistic in mind, Savage hypothesized that 
the Panzar-Rosse test would show that the interstate trucking industry is perfectly competitive; 
however, because of the entrance of stronger, smaller firms into the industry.  He examined 85 
firms from 1982 through 1987.  Through his testing he found that the interstate trucking industry 
cannot be modeled in the long-run equilibrium because of the constant disequilibrium created by 
market entrants, thus causing an inability to correctly use the Panzar-Rosse test except for to 
determine that the interstate trucking industry is at neither of the extremes; totally monopolistic 
nor totally perfectly competitive. 
To the best of our knowledge the Panzar-Rosse test has never been applied to the food 
manufacturing sector. 
 Industry Structure: Monopolistic Competition 
While the Panzar-Rosse test does concern monopolies, monopolistic competition, and 
perfect competition, an emphasis is placed on monopolistic competition in this thesis due to the 
hypothesis that the dried plum industry in the United States is monopolistically competitive.  
“Monopolistic competition occurs when a firm is acting partially as a monopoly in that it has 
market power over a differentiated product and partially as a perfectly competitive firm in that it 
is producing where marginal revenue is equal to marginal costs, but price equals average cost, or 
with zero economic profits in the long-run” (Silva 2010, p. 20).  In a monopolistically 
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competitive market, there are relatively low barriers to entry.  Product differentiation creates a 
situation where firms in a monopolistically competitive industry face downward sloping demand 
curves. 
Monopolistic competition was first presented by Chamberlin (1933) and Robinson 
(1933).  Chamberlin (1933) was the first to coin the specific term “monopolistic competition”; 
however.  As defined in Sullivan and Sheffrin (2001), monopolistic competition is a “market 
serviced by dozens of firms selling slightly different products.”  Multiple firms are participating 
because there are relatively small economies of scale, which allow for larger and smaller firms to 
coexist at about the same level and industry structure, and both remain profitable due to product 
differentiation (Silva 2010, p.22). 
Most of the literature on monopolistic competition simply confirms its existence and 
provides further basic definitions of the industry structure while also mentioning its effects on 
international trade.  Some of these examples include “Krugman (1979), Lanclos and Hertel 
(1995), Heffernan (2002), Coto-Martinez (2006), Feenstra and Taylor (2008), Raun, Gopinath, 
and Buccola (2008) and Feenstra and Weinstein (2010)” (Boland et al 2012, p.4-5).  Lanclos and 
Hertel (1995) specifically mention differences between perfect competition and monopolistic 
competition by examining the dependence of monopolistically competitive firms on fixed costs, 
which include farm and food input costs leading into the processing sector, thus monopolistic 
competition is more effected by price fluctuations of fixed costs.  Fixed costs are absent under 
perfect competition; however, but because of this variability of costs, more market exits occur by 
firms that cannot keep up with the volatility of the market.  Aside from these literary examples, 
there are very few that present models that test for monopolistic competition, and even fewer 
have any mention of the food and agricultural industry. 
As shown by Silva (2010) in a previous study conducted at Kansas State University, the 
Sunsweet Cooperative has a downward sloping demand curve which demonstrates that the 
individual firm is consistent with a “monopoly” over its product range.  Previously, a study 
conducted by Alston et al. (1998) found that the Sunsweet Cooperative, California’s largest 
member owned cooperative, controlled over 70 percent of the retail sales in the dried plums 
industry with their retail competitors at the time being primarily the firms Del Monte and Dole.  
Since this study was conducted, the number of competitors has increased, leading to a decline of 
Sunsweet’s market share to 58 percent suggesting that there were profits to be made in the 
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industry, thus the increase of market entrants occurred.  This increase in the number of firms 
participating in the industry led to the increase of product differentiation and indicates a potential 
shift from a tight structural oligopoly, or dominant firm model, to a model more consistent with 
monopolistic competition.  Figure 2.1 demonstrates the movement of Sunsweet to a long-run 
equilibrium under monopolistic competition. 
 
Figure 2-1:Monopolistic Competition in the Short and Long Run 
 
Figure 2.1 assumes that Sunsweet was initially producing on the portion of its average 
revenue curve where AR
0
, average revenue, is greater than AC
0
, average cost, as illustrated by the 
dashed lines.  Because of this, other possible market entrants saw that there were profits to be 
made in the dried plum industry, and because barriers to entry are not high, entered into the 
market.  Once more competitors entered into the market, Sunsweet saw a decrease in AR
1
, 
average revenue, and thus their revenue shifted from AR
0
 to AR
1
 until average revenue was 
tangent to the new average cost curve, AC
1
 as illustrated by the solid lines.  Once this shift 
occurs, no new competitors will enter the market (Silva 2010, p.22).  In the remaining chapters, 
we will show the evolution of the dried plum market’s industry structure through showing the 
shift from a monopolistically leaning monopolistic competitor, to more of a perfect competition 
leaning monopolistic competitor.  
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 Industry Structure of the United States Dried Plum Industry 
According to Boland et al (2012) in their study of advertising benefits under monopolistic 
competition, the industry structure for dried and dehydrated foods has been able to escape the 
concentration ratios as seen by other participants in the food industry with a “four firm 
concentration ratio in 2007 of only 35.9%”.  Because dried plum consumption has been declining 
during the past decade, there have been major shifts in the amount of production seen at the 
farm-level, thus leading to a decline of exports.  Interestingly enough, even though there has 
been a decline in dried plum consumption, there has been an increase in the number of firm-level 
participants.  During the 1990s, there were three firms that held a majority of the market share in 
the domestic market with Sunsweet Cooperative holding 80 percent of the market share alone.  
Today, there are six major competitors, dropping Sunsweet’s market share to 60 percent.  
According to Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), this decline in demand along with an increase in the 
variety of products produced in the dried plums industry are possible outcomes of a 
monopolistically competitive industry structure. 
In looking specifically at advertising within the dried plums industry, the vast majority of 
all promotions are paid for by Sunsweet Cooperative and the other competitors use the free-rider 
effect as described by Alston et al. (2007) and forgo most of their advertising expenses because 
the dried plums industry is selling homogenous products.  Because of this effect, advertising 
expenses are not a barrier to entry, thus providing further evidence that the dried plums industry 
is monopolistically competitive. 
Even though firms use the free-rider effect in terms of advertising expenses, the varying 
dried plum brands are still clearly differentiated.  This is evidenced by the variance in retail 
prices of dried plums and their differentiated product line (i.e. Sunsweet Ones ®).  The variation 
of products by just a few firms is another key assumption of monopolistic competition (Boland et 
al 2012). 
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Chapter 3 - Data 
 The data set used for this study is weekly data ranging from September 6, 1992 through 
July 7, 1996 with a total of 52 observations per firm; and weekly data ranging July 20, 2008 
through June 13, 2010 with a total of 100 observations per firm.  The majority of the first data 
range, 1992 through 1996, was used in a previous study conducted by Alston et al. (1998), and 
was provided by the authors.  The majority of the second data range, 2008 through 2010, was 
provided by the Sunsweet Cooperative.  The following are the descriptions of the data used in 
the model described in Chapter 2, Literature Review.  
 Revenue 
Revenue, R, is compiled by multiplying the branded quantity, the total number of prunes 
consumed in the United States for a specified week, by each brand’s respective price.  The 
quantities were broken down by firm: QSUN, QPL, QCA, QDM, QMA, QSM, and QD 
representing Sunsweet, Private Label, Champion, Del Monte, Mariani, Sun Maid, and Dole 
respectively.  The price variables follow the same format: PSUN, PPL, PCA, PDM, PMA, PSM, 
and PD.  PSUN represents the average price per pound of Sunsweet dried plums.  This is the 
weighted average of the average promoted price per pound and the non-promoted price per 
pound for that particular week reflecting price discounts given at the retail level.  These prices 
were provided by Sunsweet’s Infoscan IRI database and were converted to 2010 dollars by using 
the Consumer Price Index, CPI, from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  These data were then 
multiplied by an average markdown percentage of 59 percent, an estimate provided by a 
Sunsweet analyst, to convert retail prices to Sunsweet’s estimate of its perceived price (Silva 
2010).  While the average markdown is specified for Sunsweet, it is applied to all prices, 
Sunsweet and its competitors, for consistency. 
PPL, PCA, PDM, PMA, PSM, and PD are the individual retail prices of each of 
Sunsweet’s competitors.  These prices were extracted from the Sunsweet Infoscan IRI database.  
All variables represent the average price per pound of prunes.  This average consists of the 
average price per pound and the average non-promoted price per pound for that particular week 
weighted by the share of sales during these weeks.  These prices were also converted to 2010 
dollars using the CPI.  
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 Marketing Costs 
Promotion expenditure variables are the percentage of all commodity value of retail 
stores, and measure the trade merchandising “reach” and depth” of support; percentage of stores 
(in terms of annual sales) that sold the product with any sort of merchandising (features, 
displays, or price reductions) during a specified time period.  As described by Crespi and Marette 
(2002), these variables are “weighted by store size that show whether a particular promotion was 
occurring in a store at time, t”.  Promotion expenditure variables are broken down by display, 
%ACVD; feature, %ACVF; and feature/display, %ACVFD.  A display is a promotion using an in-
store display with no other advertising occurring in-store.  A feature is a product promotion 
without a display, such as newspaper advertising.  A feature and display is a combination of both 
of these methods.  Since the price of these expenditures is already reflected in price promotions, 
we need not include price promotions as a part of %ACVD, %ACVF, and %ACVFD.  These 
variables are essentially proxy firm expenditures and can be best thought of as representing 
‘promotions’ instead of advertising (Silva 2010).  Our assumption is that the promotion 
expenditures correlate perfectly over the short time period with the actual percentage variables.  
For example, if x is a unit of promotion, and w is the cost of that promotion, then the percentage 
change in w*x is equal to the percentage change captured by %ACVD, %ACVF, and %ACVFD.  
To the extent that this assertion is incorrect, we leave that as a caveat of the analysis as it was not 
clear how to test this assertion.  Nonetheless, expenditure increases with increased promotion 
seems reasonable. 
Also included in the model are the expenditures for Sunsweet Cooperative’s television 
promotions, SunTV.  These expenditures are in dollars and are weighted to account for the 
varying times the commercials are displayed during broadcast.   The other firms did not conduct 
national television advertising during the time periods of either of the data sets. 
FarmP is the annual value per unit (ton) price of California dried plums according the 
United States Department of Agriculture (2011).  FarmP is the average annual farm price based 
on the date in which the data was collected spanning from 1992 through 1996 and from 2008 
through 2010.  This value was used to estimate the cost of the dried plums to the firm.   It must 
be noted that FarmP has little variance over the time periods in both data sets. 
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 Other Revenue Shifters 
We included other shifters that may have effects on the branded revenues.  The Producer 
Price Index, PPI, is included in this model to help account for the average changes in price faced 
by the producer.  The PPI is also compiled on an annual basis and was assigned in accordance to 
the above criteria. 
Quarterly data of per-capita personal income (Income) extracted from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics is used in this model.  Income was also adjusted to 2010 dollars using CPI. 
Dried plum substitutes prices (RPS) include the prices of pertinent substitutes for dried 
plums, specifically other dried fruits and raisins.  This variable was also multiplied by the 
aforementioned 59 percent markdown to convert retail prices to processor prices. 
SUD, PLD, CAD, DMD, MAD, SMD, and DD are firm dummy variables to represent the 
firms Sunsweet, Private Label, Champion, Del Monte, Mariani, Sun Maid, and Dole 
respectively.  Including these creates a fixed-effects regression model. 
A time trend variable was added to the model and was simply a numbering of each 
observation from 1 to 53 for the early years’ data set and 1 to 100 for the more recent years’ data 
set.  
On the following pages, Table 3.1 provides a detailed listing of the variables used, 
followed by Table 3.2 which shows the summary statistics for the data. 
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Table 3-1:Variable Descriptions 
Variable Definition Units Data Source 
QSUN, QPL, 
QCA, QDM, 
QMA, QSM, and 
QD 
 
Weekly volume of sales 
by firm 
Pounds Sunsweet Infoscan 
IRI Database 
PSUN, PPL, PCA, 
PDM, PMA, PSM, 
and PD 
Average retail price of 
dried plums from firm to 
retailers 
Real dollars (2010) 
per pound of dried 
plums 
Retail prices came 
from Infoscan IRI 
data provided by 
Sunsweet, were 
calculated by the 
markdown figure 
provided by Sunsweet 
and were deflated by 
CPI from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics 
 
R Total weekly volume of 
sales by firm multiplied 
by the average retail price 
of dried plums from firm 
to retailers for all firms 
Real dollars (2010) Retail prices came 
from Infoscan IRI 
data provided by 
Sunsweet, were 
calculated by the 
markdown figure 
provided by Sunsweet 
and were deflated by 
CPI from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics 
 
CPI Consumer Price Index, 
Average change in the 
price that consumers pay 
for goods 
 
Percentage Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
%ACVD Percentage of all 
commodity value of retail 
stores with a display 
 
Percentage Sunsweet Infoscan 
IRI Database 
%ACVF Percentage of all 
commodity value of retail 
stores with a feature 
 
Percentage Sunsweet Infoscan 
IRI Database 
Continued. 
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Variable Definition Units Data Source 
%ACVFD Percentage of all 
commodity value of retail 
stores with a feature and 
display 
 
Percentage Sunsweet Infoscan 
IRI Database 
SunTV Weighted expenditures of 
Sunsweet television 
promotions 
 
Real dollars (2010) Sunsweet Infoscan 
IRI Database 
FarmP Value per ton of dried 
plums to the producer 
Real dollars (2010) United States 
Department of 
Agriculture 
 
PPI Producer Price Index, 
Average change in the 
price faced by producers 
 
Percentage Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
Income Yearly average personal 
income 
Personal income by 
quarter in real dollars 
(2010) 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis; Adjusted by 
CPI 
 
RPS Average price of 
substitutes for dried plums 
Real dollars (2010) Retail prices came 
from Infoscan IRI 
data provided by 
Sunsweet, were 
calculated by the 
markdown figure 
provided by Sunsweet 
and were deflated by 
CPI from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics 
 
SUD, PLD, CAD, 
DMD,MAD,SMD, 
and DD 
 
Dummy variables 
representing each firm 
respectively 
 
  
Trend Time Trend 1,2,3… 
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Table 3-2:Summary Statistics: 1992-1996 
Variable N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Revenue 
(Monthly) 
156 1,158,649 1,164,546 71,093.99 2,914,738 
Revenue 
(~Weekly) 
156 289,662.25 291,136.5 17,773.50 728,684.5 
%ACVD 156 4.661257 5.11859 0 18.001 
%ACVF 156 7.712538 8.888564 0 30 
%ACVFD 156 1.379205 1.958745 0 8 
SUNTV 156 111,098.3 175,529.5 0 565,361.4 
FarmP 156 1,102.059 121.7221 839 1,234.84 
PPI 156 129.3096 3.455277 125.8 134.6 
CPI 156 0.9470385 0.0300715 0.896 1 
Income 156 18,706.49 503.6629 17,780.13 19,500 
RPS 156 2.393279 0.0412976 2.308167 2.524745 
Trend 156 26.5 15.056647 1 52 
Note: Original Revenue data was provided on a per month basis for this particular data set.  It 
was converted to a ‘~Weekly’ basis by dividing by four to account for the average four week 
month. 
 
Table 3-3:Summary Statistics: 2008-2010 
Variable N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Revenue 
(Weekly) 
600 209,487.2 287,719.6 4,853.304 1,069,721 
%ACVD 600 4.167613 2.990138 0.001 9.67603 
%ACVF 600 0.5450405 0.9938818 0.001 7.38749 
%ACVFD 600 0.1158278 0.2451074 0.001 2.08729 
SUNTV 600 39,959.7 132,728.7 0.001 592,500.8 
FarmP 600 1,306.979 116.5972 1,226.376 1,552.137 
PPI 600 141.259 8.891322 131.2 162 
CPI 600 0.9907537 .0115144 0.9664093 1.011165 
Income 600 35,580.98 259.4966 35,124 35,920 
RPS 600 0.3571155 .7996054 0.001 2.26457 
Trend 600 50.5 28.89016 1 100 
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Chapter 4 - Regression Results 
In this section, different regression equations are presented that will give us the results 
needed to calculate the Panzar-Rosse H-Statistic (as seen following these results in Chapter 5).  
Please note that several regression equations were tested, but we found that the four presented 
were a good representative sample of all models tested.  Each of the Models 1 through 4 are the 
same for both sets of data, 1992 through 1996, and 2008 through 2010.  Each data set has its own 
particular results provided following the presentation of the models. 
 Models 
Model 1 
 
ln(Ri,t) = δi + δ1ln(%ACVDi,t) + δ2ln(%ACVFi,t) + δ3ln(%ACVFDi,t) + δ4ln(SunTVi,t) + δ5ln(FarmPi,t)  
+ θ1(RPSt) + θ2(Incomet) + θ3ln(PPIt) + θ4(Trendt) 
 
where Ri,t is equal to the revenue of the firm, i, at time, t; δi represents the firm-level dummy 
variables  with the excluded variable (the constant) representing Sunsweet (hence, DMD, DD for 
1992 through 1996; and PLD, CAD, DMD, MAD, and SMD for 2008 through 2010); 
δ1ln(%ACVDi,t), δ2ln(%ACVFi,t), δ3ln(%ACVFDi,t), δ4ln(SunTVi,t), and δ5ln(FarmPi,t) are the 
representative input costs for the industry based on the mean of firm level costs; θ1(RPSt), 
θ2(Incomet), and θ3ln(PPIt) are the representative exogenous variables affecting the industry; and 
θ4(Trendt) is a time trend variable applied to each observation.  Other input costs that we would 
have liked to have included in our model but did not have access to include: processing costs, 
labor costs, manufacturing costs, and other input costs that are incurred by the firm. 
 
Model 2 
 
ln(Ri,t) = δi + δ1ln(%ACVDi,t) + δ2ln(%ACVFi,t) + δ3ln(%ACVFDi,t) + δ4ln(SunTVi,t)  
+ θ1(RPSt) + θ2(Incomet) + θ3ln(PPIt) + θ4(Trendt) 
 
The variable definitions are the same as with Model 1, but note that FarmP is excluded from this 
model. 
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Model 3 
 
ln(Ri,t) = δi + δ1ln(%ACVDi,t) + δ2ln(%ACVFi,t) + δ3ln(%ACVFDi,t) + δ4ln(SunTVi,t) + δ5ln(FarmPi,t)  
+ θ1(RPSt) + θ2(Incomet) + θ3(CPIt) + θ4(Trendt) 
 
The variable definition are the same as with Model 1, but notice the inclusion of CPI and the 
exclusion of ln(PPI). The CPI did not need to be in the logged because there was weekly data 
available; therefore, providing enough variation so that it was not treated as a trend variable. 
 
Model 4 
 
ln(Ri,t) = δi + δ1ln(%ACVDi,t) + δ2ln(%ACVFi,t) + δ3ln(%ACVFDi,t) + δ4ln(SunTVi,t) + δ5ln(FarmPi,t)  
+ θ1(RPSt) + θ2(Incomet) + θ3(CPIt) + θ4ln(Trendt) 
 
The variable names are the same with Model 3, but the Trend variable is logged in this model.
 The following pages show regression results from each of the four models for each time 
period; 1992 through 1996, and 2008 through 2010.  Following the results for each particular 
data set is further discussion about the findings.  Under each model column, the tables show first 
the coefficient estimate, then the standard error in parentheses followed by the T-statistic in 
brackets. 
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Regression Results and Discussion: 1992-1996 
 
Table 4-1:Regression Results: 1992-1996 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
ln(%ACVD) .0432792 
(.0061105) 
[7.08]* 
.0432626 
(.0060479) 
[7.15]* 
0.0430762 
(.0062266) 
[6.92]* 
.0420032 
(.0061911) 
[6.78]* 
ln(%ACVF) .0263363 
(.0056917) 
[4.63]* 
.0263239 
(.0056473) 
[4.66]* 
.0266292 
(.0056715) 
[4.70]* 
.0259467 
(.0056786) 
[4.57]* 
ln(%ACVFD) .0231472 
(.0064135) 
[3.61]* 
.0231663 
(.0063391) 
[3.65]* 
.0230595 
(.0064448) 
[3.58]* 
.0226672 
(.0064609) 
[3.51]* 
ln(SunTV) -.0171845 
(.0317415) 
[-0.54] 
-.0172009 
(.0316242) 
[-0.54] 
-.0152235 
(.0320681) 
[-0.47] 
-.0258522 
(.0325546) 
[-0.79] 
ln(FarmP) -.0047654 
(.2043228) 
[-0.02] 
 
- 
-.0045283 
(.2103446) 
[-0.02] 
-.4292513 
(.2813841) 
[-1.53] 
ln(PPI) -.6256844 
(1.151461) 
[-0.54] 
-.626593 
(1.146829) 
[-0.55] 
 
- 
 
- 
CPI  
- 
 
- 
.7954584 
(9.881764) 
[0.08] 
-11.04562 
(7.355961) 
[-1.50] 
Income .0002723 
(.0001686) 
[1.62] 
.000274 
(.0001511) 
[1.81] 
.0002254 
(.0002118) 
[1.06] 
.0001702 
(.0002126) 
[0.80] 
RPS .3835228 
(.3346361) 
[1.15] 
.3855786 
(.3217033) 
[1.20] 
.3540327 
(.350203) 
[1.01] 
.0781178 
(.3112477) 
[0.25] 
Trend -.0218927 
(.010595) 
[-2.07]* 
-.0219809 
(.0098625) 
[-2.23]* 
-.0212207 
(.0139907) 
[-1.52] 
 
- 
ln(Trend)  
- 
 
- 
 
- 
.0665861 
(.0470981 
[1.41] 
PLD - - - - 
CAD - - - - 
DMD -1.702067 
(.6207804) 
[-2.74]* 
-1.702333 
(.6185327) 
[-2.75]* 
-1.664212 
(.6286356) 
[-2.65]* 
-1.879201 
(.6385181) 
[-2.94]* 
MAD - - - - 
Continued.     
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
SMD - - - - 
DD -2.610841 
(.6209821) 
[-4.20]* 
-2.611151 
(.6186964) 
[-4.22]* 
-2.572776 
(.6291) 
[-4.09]* 
-2.790234 
(.6389625) 
[-4.37]* 
Constant 12.75399 
(5.713159) 
[2.23]* 
12.69228 
(5.046174) 
[2.52]* 
9.816055 
(8.179948) 
[1.20] 
25.01876 
(4.732919) 
[5.29]* 
Adjusted R
2 
0.9836 0.9837 0.9835 0.9835 
* Indicates statistically significant at 95% Confidence Interval 
 
 Model 1 Results Discussion 
 Panzar and Rosse showed that the impact on most costs and Revenue are not necessarily 
obvious.  Under different market structures the relationship might be positive or negative.  In 
examining Model 1, we see that advertising display (ln(%ACVD)), advertising feature (ln 
(%ACVF)), and the combination of advertising display and feature (ln(%ACVFD)) all have a 
positive effect on revenue and are all statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence 
interval.  This is to be expected because the purpose of advertising and promotions is to increase 
revenue.  With a one-percent increase in advertising display expenditures, there is an expected 
0.043 percent increase in revenue.  With a one-percent increase in advertising feature 
expenditures, there is an expected 0.026 increase in revenue. With a one percent increase in a 
combination of both display and feature advertising, there is an expected 0.23 increase in 
revenue. 
 Sunsweet’s TV advertising cost was found to have a negative effect on revenue.  At first 
this might be surprising.  However, we must recall that this is not a regression of Sunsweet’s 
advertising on Sunsweet alone, but on all firms in the industry.  Hence, while Sunsweet’s TV 
advertising is expected to positively impact Sunsweet (as shown by Alston et al (1998) and Silva 
(2010)), it likely has a negative impact on the revenues of Sunsweet’s competitors and on 
average the result on industry profits may be negative.   However, the negative effect on revenue 
is quite small at   -0.017, and the correlation results are insignificant at the 95 percent confidence 
interval so it is inconclusive as to whether these effects are telling or not.  Farm price also had a 
negative effect on revenue, -0.004.  This was also insignificant on the 95 percent confidence 
interval, so it is also inconclusive as to whether or not this is variable contains much information.  
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Because the farm price information was provided on a monthly basis, there was little variation in 
the data and this may be why we saw the insignificance. 
 In looking at the other revenue shifters in the regression, we see that PPI also has a 
negative effect on revenue and its coefficient is insignificant on the 95 percent confidence 
interval.  Because PPI is simply supplied in this regression as a revenue shifter, and is not part of 
the Panzar-Rosse H-Statistic calculation, we do not find issue with these findings.  Income has a 
positive effect on revenue showing a one percent increase in income providing a 0.0003percent  
increase in revenue.  This is insignificant; however, on the 95 percent confidence interval most 
likely due to the fact that there are a lot of repeated values in the time series data.  The real price 
of substitutes (RPS) also shows a positive effect on revenue which makes sense because an 
increase in the price of substitutes will naturally lead to an increase in firm revenue in this 
industry due to the substitution effect.  The coefficient is insignificant; however, on the 95 
percent confidence interval.  Again, this does not cause issue because there are several 
substitutes and vary widely. 
 The Trend variable shows a negative effect on revenue because it is showing the decrease 
in demand for the goods produced in the dried plums industry.  This coefficient was found to be 
significant at the 95 percent confidence interval. 
 In looking at the firm dummy variables and the Constant, it is evident that the Constant, 
Sunsweet Cooperative, has higher average revenues than the other two competing firms in the 
model; Del Monte and Dole.  The firm dummy variables for Del Monte and Dole, as well as the 
constant are all significant on the 95 percent confidence interval showing that the model is a 
good fit for the data.  The adjusted R
2
 for this model is 0.9836, which is concurrent with a 
representation of time series data. 
 Model 2 Results Discussion 
Model 2 is very similar to Model 1, except for it excludes farm price.  This exclusion did 
not change the coefficient values nor their significance enough to warrant further discussion of 
the findings in this model versus that of Model 1. 
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 Model 3 Results Discussion 
Model 3 includes farm price again and replaces the revenue shifter Producer Price Index 
(PPI),with the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The coefficients of ln(%ACVD), ln (%ACVF), 
ln(%ACVFD), ln(SunTV), and ln(FarmP) are all very similar to the findings in Model 1.  The 
advertising expenditures ln(%ACVD), ln (%ACVF), and ln(%ACVFD) all have positive effects 
on revenue and all are significant on the 95 percent confidence interval.  ln(SunTV) and 
ln(FarmP) have negative effects on revenue and remain insignificant on the 95 percent 
confidence interval as discussed in the Model 1 results discussion. 
The inclusion of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in the model shows it as having a 
positive effect on revenue which makes sense because it shows an increase in the willingness of 
consumers to pay a higher price for products which would lead to an increase in revenue.  The 
coefficient is insignificant on the 95 percent confidence interval; however, most likely due to the 
lack of variation during the time periods in which the CPI was examined for this model.  The 
Income coefficient retains its positive effect on revenue and its significance as with the previous 
models. 
The Trend variable has a very similar coefficient of that of the first two models, but is 
insignificant on the 95 percent confidence interval, unlike in the first two models.  The reason 
behind this is unknown for sure, but one hypothesis is tested in Model 4.  See the Model 4 results 
discussion for further discussion of change in significance. 
The firm level dummy variables have similar coefficients as the first two models and 
remain significant on the 95 percent confidence interval.  The Constant; however, retains its 
positive effect on revenue, but is insignificant on the 95 percent confidence interval.  The 
adjusted R
2
 value is also very similar to the previous two models showing that this data is a good 
fit for this model. 
 Model 4 Results Discussion 
Model 4 is the same as Model 3, except for the Trend variable is logged in order to test 
for underlying trend in the data.  ln(%ACVD), ln (%ACVF), and ln(%ACVFD) all retain their 
positive influences on revenue and all are significant.  ln(SunTV) retains its negative effect on 
revenue and also remains insignificant on the 95 percent confidence interval.  There is a drastic 
change; however, in ln(FarmP).  While farm price still has a negative effect on revenue, its 
26 
 
coefficient is drastically greater at -0.4292 and while the coefficient remains insignificant, it is 
much closer to being significant with a t-statistic value of -1.53. 
There is also a change seen in CPI, which now has a negative impact on revenue, but it 
remains insignificant on the 95 percent confidence interval.  The Income coefficient remains very 
similar to Models 1, 2, and 3 by retaining its positive effects on income and its insignificance.  
Real price of substitutes (RPS), while retaining its positive impact on revenue, has a decrease in 
coefficient value in comparison to the RPS coefficients in Models 1, 2, and 3(0.0779057 for 
Model 4 versus 0.3840701, 0.3855784, and 0.3550337 for Models 1, 2, and 3 respectively).  It 
still retains its insignificance; however. 
By logging the Trend variable, we see that the trend variable has a positive effect on 
revenue, which is different than Models 1, 2, and 3 which all show the trend variable as having a 
negative impact on revenue.  The ln(Trend) variable is insignificant at the 95 percent confidence 
interval.  Model 4 does not agree with the results of the previous three models as seen later when 
calculating the H-Statistic, but was included here a useful comparison and test of whether there is 
an unknown underlying trend in the data.  The adjusted R
2
 value is also very similar to the 
previous two models showing that this model is a good fit for these data. 
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 Regression Results and Discussion: 2008-2010 
 
Table 4-2:Regression Results: 2008-2010 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
ln(%ACVD) .06771 
(.0088371) 
[7.66]* 
.068853 
(.0088114) 
[7.81]* 
.0696042 
(.0086433) 
[8.05]* 
.0706655 
(.0087294) 
[8.10]* 
ln(%ACVF) .011497 
(.0033057) 
[3.48]* 
.0114281 
(.0033086) 
[3.45]* 
.0115785 
(.0032353) 
[3.58]* 
.0113581 
(.0032694) 
[3.47]* 
ln(%ACVFD) .0103334 
(.0039553) 
[2.61]* 
.0105112 
(.0039573) 
[2.66]* 
.0106696 
(.0038765) 
[2.75]* 
.0114591 
(.0039151) 
[2.93]* 
ln(SunTV) .004968 
(.0015087) 
[3.29]* 
.0048822 
(.0015091) 
[3.24]* 
.0044805 
(.00148) 
[3.03]* 
.0044855 
(.0014955) 
[3.00]* 
ln(FarmP) .1783144 
(.1215028) 
[1.47] 
 
- 
.0282404 
(.1020929) 
[0.28] 
-0.0654514 
(.106911) 
[-0.61] 
ln(PPI) -.6237238 
(.1206016) 
[-5.17]* 
-.5228368 
(.0991883) 
[-5.27]* 
 
- 
 
 
- 
CPI  
- 
 
- 
-8.076169 
(1.126525) 
[-7.17]* 
-5.358843 
(.8801117) 
[-6.09]* 
Income .0002429 
(.0000204) 
[11.88]* 
.0002475 
(.0000202) 
[12.24]* 
.0000454 
(.000039) 
[1.17] 
.0000968 
(.0000367) 
[2.64]* 
RPS -.5865391 
(.2116571) 
[-2.77]* 
-.60212217 
(.2115986) 
[-2.85]* 
-.659716 
(.2077031) 
[-3.18]* 
-.7043164 
(.2095129) 
[-3.36]* 
Trend .0008932 
(.0003435) 
[2.60]* 
.0004682 
(.000185) 
[2.53]* 
.0019509 
(.0003993) 
[4.89]* 
 
- 
ln(Trend)  
- 
 
- 
 
- 
.0391208 
(.0116253) 
[3.37]* 
PLD -2.274526 
(.4557188) 
[-4.99]* 
-2.308229 
.4555876 
[-5.07]* 
-2.434473 
(.4472116) 
[-5.44]* 
-2.528602 
(.4511369) 
[-5.60]* 
CAD -5.604304 
(.4562114) 
[-12.28]* 
-5.636468 
(.456133) 
[-12.36]* 
-5.760951 
(.4477277) 
[-12.87]* 
-5.853216 
(.4516933) 
[-12.96]* 
Continued.     
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
DMD -4.103946 
(.4582231) 
[-8.96]* 
-4.132741 
(.4582533) 
[-9.02]* 
-4.254742 
(.4497255) 
[-9.46]* 
-4.343241 
(.4537806) 
[-9.57]* 
MAD -3.561305 
(.4556399) 
[-7.82]* 
-3.595543 
(.45549) 
[-7.89]* 
-3.721343 
(.4471516) 
[-8.32]* 
-3.815778 
(.4510708) 
[-8.46]* 
SMD -3.575449 
(.455745) 
[-7.85]* 
-3.608311 
(.4556425) 
[-7.92]* 
-3.733348 
(.447247) 
[-8.35]* 
-3.825763 
(.4512) 
[-8.48]* 
DD - - - - 
Constant 7.776128 
(1.185989) 
[6.56]* 
8.445304 
(1.095909) 
[7.71]* 
20.96173 
(2.417487) 
[8.67]* 
17.1462 
(2.230874) 
[7.69]* 
Adjusted R
2 
0.9929 0.9928 0.9931 0.9930 
* Indicates statistically significant at 95% Confidence Interval 
 
 Model 1 Results Discussion 
Table 4.2 present the regression results for the more recent data set.  In examining Model 
1, we see that advertising display (ln(%ACVD)), advertising feature (ln (%ACVF)), and the 
combination of advertising display and feature (ln(%ACVFD)) all have a positive effect on 
revenue and all coefficients are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence interval.  
Again, this is to be expected because advertising and promotions are meant to increase revenues.  
With a one percent increase in advertising display expenditures, there is an expected 0.06771 % 
increase in revenue.  With a one percent increase in advertising feature expenditures, there is an 
expected 0.011497 % increase in revenue. With a one percent increase in a combination of both 
display and feature advertising, there is an expected 0.0103334 % increase in revenue. 
Unlike the previous data set, in the more recent data set, Sunsweet’s TV advertising 
expenditures (SunTV) were found to have a positive effect on revenue and its coefficient is 
significant on the 95 percent confidence interval.  With a-one percent increase in TV advertising 
expenditures, there is expected to be a 0.004968% increase in revenue.  Farm price (FarmP) was 
also found to have a positive effect on revenue and its coefficient is significant at the 95 percent 
confidence interval.   
The Producer Price Index (PPI) was found to have a negative impact on revenue and its 
coefficient was significant at the 95 percent confidence interval.  This could be due in part to the 
increase in price of dried plums to the processors; therefore, leading to higher input costs.  
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Income has a positive effect on revenue and is statistically significant on the 95 percent 
confidence interval.  This is an obvious trend because as income increasing, consumer 
purchasing power increases, thus leading to an increase in revenue.  The real price of substitutes 
has a negative effect on revenue and is significant on the 95 percent confidence interval.  This is 
due to decline in overall purchase of dried plums and the increase purchase of substitutes. 
The Trend variable has a positive effect on revenue and its coefficient is significant on 
the 95 percent confidence interval.  This could be due to the product differentiation strategies 
that firms are implementing in order to combat the aforementioned decline in the purchase of 
dried plums. 
All of the firm level dummy variables have negative coefficients meaning that the 
Constant, Sunsweet, has the highest average revenue in the industry.  All of the firm level 
dummy variable coefficients and the Constant are significant at the 95 percent confidence 
interval.  The adjusted R
2
 value is 0.9929 which is consistent with time series data.  It also 
demonstrates that this model is a good fit for these data. 
 Model 2 Results Discussion 
Model 2 is very similar to Model 1, except for it excludes farm price.  This exclusion did 
not change the coefficient values or their significance enough to warrant further discussion of the 
findings in this model versus that of Model 1. 
 Model 3 Results Discussion 
Model 3 includes farm price again and replaces the revenue shifter Producer Price Index 
(PPI),with the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The coefficients of ln(%ACVD), ln (%ACVF), 
ln(%ACVFD), ln(SunTV), and ln(FarmP) are all very similar to the findings in model one.  The 
advertising expenditures ln(%ACVD), ln (%ACVF), and ln(%ACVFD) all have positive effects 
on revenue and all are significant on the 95 percent confidence interval.  ln(SunTV) and 
ln(FarmP) have positive effects on revenue and remain insignificant on the 95 percent 
confidence interval as discussed in the Model 1 results discussion. 
The inclusion of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in the model shows it as having a 
negative effect on revenue.  This negative effect could be due volatility in CPI values during 
2008 through 2010.   The coefficient is significant on the 95 percent confidence interval.  Income 
retains its positive impact on revenue and its significance as with the previous two models. 
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The Trend variable retains its positive coefficient and its significance. The firm level 
dummy variables have similar coefficients as the first two models and remain significant on the 
95 percent confidence interval.  The Constant also retains its positive effect on revenue and its 
significance.  The adjusted R
2
 value is also very similar to the previous two models showing that 
this data is a good fit for this model. 
 Model 4 Results Discussion 
Model 4 is the same as Model 3, except for the Trend variable is logged.  All the results 
are very similar to Model 3 for all of the variables, except for farm price. The impact of FarmP 
became a negative effect on revenue, but retained its insignificance. 
 Differences in Results between Data Sets 
Comparisons of the two data sets are cautionary because one data set is longer than the 
other.  During the time period of 1992 through 1996, the farm price (FarmP) has a negative 
effect on income.  During the time period of 2008 through 2010, farm price had a positive effect 
on income.  This could be due to the differences in farm prices and the increase in purchasing 
power of the processors.  Income was insignificant for all models in the 1992 through 1996 data 
set, and significant for Models 1, 2, and 4 in the 2008 through 2010 data set.   
The real price of substitutes (RPS) had a positive effect on income for all models during 
the 1992 through 1996 time period, and had a negative impact on revenue for the 2008 through 
2010 time period.  In the first data set, the real price of substitutes has a positive impact because 
of the substitution effect.  As the price of substitutes rises, the revenue for the dried plum 
industry rises as consumers look for cheaper alternatives.    The negative impact on revenue seen 
in years 2008 through 2010 can be demonstrative of a decline in dried plum consumption, a 
demand for substitutes, and substitutes being sold at lower prices.  The RPS values were also 
insignificant for 1992 through 1996 and significant for 2008 through 2010. 
Other small differences include the effect of CPI on income in Model 3.  In 1992 through 
1996, CPI had a positive effect on revenue.  In 2008 through 2010, CPI had a negative effect on 
revenue which could be due to volatility in CPI values.  Finally, ln(Trend) was insignificant for 
Model 4 for 1992 through 1996, and significant for 2008 through 2010.  These results are now 
used to formulate the H-Statistic found in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5 - Panzar-Rosse H-Statistic 
The following is a review of the methods used to calculate the Panzar-Rosse H-Statistic, 
the H-Statistics calculated for both data sets, and a discussion of these results.   
 H-Statistic Formulation 
As aforementioned in Chapter 2, the Panzar-Rosse H-Statistic is the sum of all of the 
elasticities of a firm’s total revenue with respect to factor input prices focusing on the long-run 
equilibrium.  In this particular case,  the coefficients were taken from the following variables in 
the regressions in Chapter 4: ln(%ACVD), ln(%ACVF), ln(%ACVFD), ln(SunTV), and ln(FarmP) 
and adding these coefficients results in the H-Statistic.  Once calculated, the H-Statistic can be 
interpreted to determine if the industry is monopolistic, monopolistically competitive, or 
perfectly competitive.   H<0 if an industry is monopolistic (e.g. firms are behaving collusively), 
0<H<1 if an industry is monopolistically competitive, and H=1 if the industry is perfectly 
competitive. 
Once the H-Statistic is calculated, because the underlying distribution of each coefficient 
is assumed normal and because the H-Statistic is a simple sum, the standard error for the H-
Statistic itself can be derived by adding the coefficient standard errors as well.  A 95 percent 
confidence interval is then derived.  The following pages (Table 5.1 and Table 5.2) present the 
coefficients of each variable for each model, along with the standard error, variance, H-Statistic, 
H-Variance, and whether or not the H-Statistic is statistically significant or not.  
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Table 5-1:Panzar-Rosse H-Statistics, 1992-1996 
Model 1 Coefficient Standard Error Variance 
ln(%ACVD) 0.043279 0.006111 3.73382E-05 
ln(%ACVF) 0.026336 0.005692 3.23954E-05 
ln%(ACVFD) 0.023147 0.006414 4.1133E-05 
ln(SunTV) -0.01718 0.031742 0.001007523 
ln(FarmP) -0.00477 0.204323 0.041747807 
H-Statistic 0.070813*           S.E.:  0.25428         H-Var: 0.042866196 
H-Stat – ln(FarmP) 0.075578* H-Var – ln(FarmP) 0.001118389 
    
Model 2 Coefficient Standard Error Variance 
ln(%ACVD) 0.043263 0.006048 3.65771E-05 
ln(%ACVF) 0.026324 0.005647 3.1892E-05 
ln%(ACVFD) 0.023166 0.006339 4.01842E-05 
ln(SunTV) -0.0172 0.031624 0.00100009 
ln(FarmP) - - - 
H-Statistic 0.075552*           S.E.: 0.0496585      H-Var: 0.001108743 
    
Model 3 Coefficient Standard Error Variance 
ln(%ACVD) 0.0430762 0.006227 3.87705E-05 
ln(%ACVF) 0.026629 0.005672 3.21659E-05 
ln%(ACVFD) 0.02306 0.006445 4.15354E-05 
ln(SunTV) -0.01522 0.032068 0.001028363 
ln(FarmP) -0.00453 0.210345 0.044244851 
H-Statistic 0.073013*           S.E.: 0.2607556      H-Var: 0.045385686 
H-Stat – ln(FarmP) 0.077541* H-Var – ln(FarmP) 0.001140835 
    
Model 4 Coefficient Standard Error Variance 
ln(%ACVD) 0.042003 0.006191 3.83297E-05 
ln(%ACVF) 0.025947 0.005679 3.22465E-05 
ln%(ACVFD) 0.022667 0.006461 4.17432E-05 
ln(SunTV) -0.02585 0.032555 0.001059802 
ln(FarmP) -0.42925 0.281384 0.079177012 
H-Statistic -0.36449*           S.E.: 0.3322693      H-Var: 0.080349133 
H-Stat – ln(FarmP) 0.064765* H-Var – ln(FarmP) 0.001172121 
Note: * Statistically Significant from Zero and One at 95 Percent Confidence Interval 
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Table 5-2:Panzar-Rosse H-Statistics, 2008-2010 
Model 1 Coefficient Standard Error Variance 
ln(%ACVD) 0.06771 0.008837 0.0000780943 
ln(%ACVF) 0.011497 0.003306 0.0000109277 
ln%(ACVFD) 0.010333 0.003955 0.0000156444 
ln(SunTV) 0.004968 0.001509 0.00000227618 
ln(FarmP) 0.178314 0.121503 0.01476293 
H-Statistic 0.272823*           S.E.: 0.13911          H-Var: 0.014869873 
H-Stat – ln(FarmP) 0.094508* H-Var – ln(FarmP) 0.000106943 
    
Model 2 Coefficient Standard Error Variance 
ln(%ACVD) 0.068853 0.008811 0.0000776408 
ln(%ACVF) 0.011428 0.003309 0.0000109468 
ln%(ACVFD) 0.010511 0.003957 0.0000156602 
ln(SunTV) 0.004882 0.001509 0.00000227738 
ln(FarmP) - - - 
H-Statistic 0.095675*           S.E.: 0.017586        H-Var: 0.000106525 
    
Model 3 Coefficient Standard Error Variance 
ln(%ACVD) 0.069604 0.008643 0.0000747066 
ln(%ACVF) 0.011579 0.003235 0.0000104672 
ln%(ACVFD) 0.01067 0.003877 0.0000150273 
ln(SunTV) 0.004481 0.00148 0.0000021904 
ln(FarmP) 0.02824 0.102093 0.01042296 
H-Statistic 0.124573*            S.E: 0.119328        H-Var: 0.010525352 
H-Stat – ln(FarmP) 0.096333* H-Var – ln(FarmP) 0.000102391 
    
Model 4 Coefficient Standard Error Variance 
ln(%ACVD) 0.070666 0.008729 0.0000762024 
ln(%ACVF) 0.011358 0.003269 0.000010689 
ln%(ACVFD) 0.011459 0.003915 0.000015328 
ln(SunTV) 0.004486 0.001496 0.00000223652 
ln(FarmP) -0.065451 0.106911 0.011429962 
H-Statistic 0.032517             S.E.: 0.12432          H-Var: 0.011534418 
H-Stat – ln(FarmP) 0.097968* H-Var – ln(FarmP) 0.000104456 
Note: * Statistically Significant from Zero and One at 95 Percent Confidence Interval 
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 Discussion of H-Statistic Results 
In examining the H-Statistics calculated for years 1992 through 1996, Model 1 has a H-
Statistic of 0.07; Model 2, H=0.08; and Model 3, H=0.07.  All three H-Statistics for these models 
are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence interval; therefore, these H-Statistics are 
significantly different from zero and from one, the two bounds of the market structure under the 
Panzar-Rosse test.  This is important in our analysis because as stated in the introduction for this 
chapter, H<0 for monopoly (an industry that is acting collusively), 0<H<1 for monopolistic 
competition, and H<1 for perfect competition.  These three models suggest then that the dried 
plums industry, while very near zero (monopoly), was monopolistically competitive in this 
earlier time period. 
The fourth model; however, shows us very different results.  The H-Statistic for Model 4 
is -0.36.  The H-Statistic is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence interval.  Recall 
that Model 4 is different than the previous three models in that the Trend variable is logged in an 
effort to insure there aren’t any underlying trend variables.  By doing so, it drastically changed 
the farm price (FarmP) coefficient.  This could be due in part because the farm price that we 
have made available to us is on a monthly basis, versus the other data, which is weekly basis.  
This model then suggests that the dried plum industry was monopolistic during this early time 
period.  However, given the high R-Square values in each model and that the insignificant 
FarmP coefficients in Models 1, 2, and 3 change sign and magnitude so dramatically while 
remaining insignificant in Model 4 suggests there is a problem with this variable.  This is not 
surprising as FarmP was an annual observation so has almost no variation within the sample.  
Striking FarmP from the analysis due to its insignificance would keep the H-Statistic in the 
monopolistic competition range as shown in the above tables.  
In examining the H-Statistics calculated for years 2008 through 2010, Model 1 has a H-
Statistic of 0.27; Model 2, H=0.09; Model 3, H=0.12; Model 4, H=0.03.  All four H-Statistics are 
statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence interval; therefore, these H-Statistics are 
significantly different from zero and one.  Again, this is important because of the H-Statistic 
parameters aforementioned.  These four models suggest that the dried plum industry is 
monopolistically competitive and not very different from what was found in the earlier data set. 
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Shifts in H-Statistic Values 
In comparing the H-Statistic values for each model between the two data sets, we see 
Model 1 shows an increase (0.07 to 0.27) in H-Statistic values, which demonstrates a shift within 
the monopolistic competitive industry structure closer to the perfect competition end of the 
spectrum.  Model 2 also shows a very slight increase (0.07 to 0.09) demonstrating similar results 
as with Model 1.  Model 3also sees an upward shift in H-Statistic values (0.07 to 0.12) which, 
while this is still representative of a monopolistically competitive industry structure, moves 
closer to the perfect competition end of the spectrum.  Model 4 sees an increase (-0.36 to 0.03) 
showing a shift from the monopolistic industry structure to monopolistically competitive.  
However, if we strike FarmP from the calculation of the H-Statistic because the coefficient is 
always insignificant yet its sign and magnitude changes so much in Model 4, we find that the H-
Statistic shifts from 0.06 to 0.1 which would keep within the monopolistic competitive range for 
both the earlier and later data sets.  A visual comparison of the H-Statistic values between the 
two data sets can be seen in Figure 5.1 on the following page. 
Before completing this study, we hypothesized that we would see that the dried plums 
market was shifting from an industry that participates collusively with few firms to a 
monopolistically competitive firm with the addition of market entrants between the time of each 
of the data set compilations. After completing the study, we are unable to say that this is 
happening definitively because of the differences in shifts of the H-Statistics for each of the 
models between each of the data sets. 
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Figure 5-1: H-Statistic Value Shifts 
 
 
*Note: Model 4 is shown with the H-Stat striking FarmP from the calculation due to the poor 
specification of that variable.  The regression itself is unchanged.
1992-1996 
2008-2010 
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion 
This analysis examines the industry structure of the dried plums market through the use 
of the Panzar-Rosse test for industry structure and the analysis of the Panzar-Rosse H-Statistic.  
Based on the parameters of the H-Statistic calculation, regression equations were calculated to 
determine the elasticities of the input costs and other exogenous costs affecting the industry.  
Once calculated, the coefficients of the input costs for %ACVD, %ACV F, %ACVFD, SunTV, 
and FarmP were summed in order to find the H-Statistic for each model. 
The resulting H-Statistics for the first data set (1992-1996) were 0.07, 0.08, 0.07 and         
--0.36 and were all statistically significant on the 95 percent confidence interval.  In using the H-
Statistic parameters: H<0 if an industry is monopolistic (e.g. firms are behaving collusively), 
0<H<1 if an industry is monopolistically competitive, and H=1 if the industry is perfectly 
competitive; we found that the first three H-Statistics suggest that the dried plums industry is 
monopolistically competitive, while the fourth model suggests that the dried plums industry is 
acting collusively (or monopolistically). However, if we examine Model 4 further, and strike the 
coefficient on FarmP from its construction because of the data issues, we find that the new H-
Statistic is 0.06, consistent with the findings of the other models, suggesting that the dried plums 
industry is monopolistically competitive. 
The resulting H-Statistics for the second data set (2008-2010) were 0.27, 0.01, 0.12, and   
0.03 and were all statistically significant on the 95 percent confidence interval.  In using the H-
Statistic parameters aforementioned, all four H-Statistics suggest that the dried plums market is 
monopolistically competitive.  As with the previous data set, if we examine Model 4 further, and 
strike the coefficient from the problematic FarmP variable in the construction of the H-statistic 
we find that the new H-Statistic is 0.09; further suggesting that the dried plums industry is 
monopolistically competitive and, again viewing a result consistent with the other models. 
In examining the evolution of the dried plums industry from the time period of the first 
data set (1992-1996) through the time period of the second data set (2008-2010) we found some 
interesting, though minor, shifts in H-Statistic values.  Once the problematic FarmP variable is 
accounted for in Model 4, we find that the industry has become slightly more competitive over 
the years, but still monopolistically competitive.  
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Overall, based both on the insight of the industry from the published literature and our 
results here, we would conclude that there is fair evidence that the dried plums market is 
operating under monopolistic competition.  This study is further useful  because it provides 
evidence that the dried plums industry is monopolistically competitive, it confirms assertions 
made in previous published studies and confirms their findings about the dried plums industry. 
Future studies may include data that is collected in smaller time intervals (i.e. weekly versus 
monthly); more detailed data on specific input costs and exogenous costs from each firm, and  
further econometric testing to determine the validity of the firm-level panel data presented.  
Overall this study provides insightful information on the industry structure of this small, niche 
agricultural market. 
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